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Compulsory Schooling and the Returns to Education: A Re-
examination 
 
Sophie van Huellen* and Duo Qin** 
 
Abstract  
 
We re-examine the effect of compulsory school law on education in the US pioneered by 
Angrist and Krueger (1991). We show that the standard instrumental variable approach of the 
education variable not only yields empirically inconsistent estimates, but is conceptually 
confused. The confusion arises from the rejection of the key causal variable as a valid 
conditional variable. By route of a causally explicit model design we are able to identify the 
circumstances under which the formerly rejected variable can yield valid inference values. Our 
investigation demonstrates the importance of building data-consistent models over estimator 
choice in successful research designs. 
 
Keywords: instrumental variables, randomisation, research design, returns to education, 
treatment effect 
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2 
1. Introduction 
Over the past century, compulsory school law (CSL) was introduced in virtually every 
middle and high income country. Such law sets either the minimum number of years of school 
attendance or the minimum age for leaving school or both. The introduction of the CSL in the 
US is believed to have greatly contributing to the “High School Movement” between 1910–40 
(Goldin and Katz 2007), by which the rate of US high school graduates more than quintupled 
(Goldin 1998). The precise effect of the CSL with regards to educational attainment as well as 
income has been subject to empirical investigations in labour economics and microeconomics 
since the 1990s.  
These investigations are pioneered by Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001), who use CSL indicators as instruments to ‘randomise’ latent ability across 
educational attainment groups. As CSL treatment can be conceptualised as natural experiment, 
the instrumental variable (IV) treatment of education corrects for the assumed bias in the 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimator; see Angrist and Pischke (2009, Ch. 4) and also Harmon 
et al. (2003). The influence of these two seminal papers reaches far beyond the estimation of 
CSL effects. The empirical strategy is now common practice in research on returns to education 
as well as programme evaluation modelling, e.g. Harmon et al. (2003), Ludwig et al. (2012, 
2013), and the two papers have entered the standard economics curriculum as evident from 
their appearance in two popular textbooks by Angrist and Pischke (2009, 2015).  
Despite the far reaching influence of these studies, the estimation of CSL effect on 
income is subject to controversy. The controversy is evoked by two interlinked developments 
in the literature: a) a shift in the interpretation of the CSL instrumentalised returns to schooling 
coefficient despite identical modelling choice, and b) contradictory empirical results which 
vary significantly with the choice of CSL indicators. Angrist and Krueger (1991), who 
approximate CSL with quarter of birth dummies, interpret their results as unbiased estimates 
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3 
of returns to education, and find that the IV estimates are not statistically different from the 
‘untreated’ education estimates obtained via OLS.1 Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) construct 
alternative CSL indicators based on labour law that produce IV estimates which, although 
significantly different from OLS estimates, are insignificant or negative.2 Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) no longer interpret the IV estimates as unbiased returns to schooling, but as the 
causal effect of CSL on earnings via schooling. These CSL indicators are further refined by 
Stephens Jr. and Yang (2014). Their results verify the finding of largely insignificant IV 
estimates by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014, p.1789) conclude 
that there is ‘no evidence of benefits to additional schooling’ due to CSL. The result of 
insignificant IV estimates potentially encouraged this shift in interpretation. The conclusion of 
no CSL effect is counterintuitive, but zero returns to schooling are economically untenable.   
Despite the careful refinement of CSL indicators, IV estimates presented by Stephen Jr. 
and Yang (2014) lack consistency and robustness relative to their OLS counterparts. The IV 
estimates fail to converge in large samples, are highly sensitive to the inclusion of additional 
control variables and standard errors remain large despite large sample size. For instance, the 
inclusion of interaction terms, which allow for regional differences in year of birth effects, 
leads to large changes in the IV estimates whereas the OLS estimates remain virtually invariant 
(see Figure 1).  
                                                          
1 E.g. column (5) versus (6) in Table 4, (7) versus (8) in Table 5, (1) versus (2) and (5) versus (6) in Table 6 in 
Angrist and Krueger (1991). More evidence in Hoogerheide and van Dijk (2006, Table 5) and in Harmon et al. 
(2003, Section 5). 
2 See Angrist and Pischke (2015, Table 6.3) for a summary. 
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FIGURE 1. OSL AND IV ESTIMATOR CONSISTENCY. 
Notes: IV1 and OLS1 are IV and OLS estimates without regional control variables and IV2 and 
OLS2 are IV and OLS estimates with regional control variables included. The x-axis provides the 
sample size and the y-axes coefficient values (left axis for IV estimates and right axis for OLS 
estimates). The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. Source: SY, Table 1. 
The lack of consistency and robustness of attendance law based IV-estimates led 
Angrist and Pischke (2015, p.227) to discard the Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) indicator choice 
as ‘a failed research design’, while presenting the Angrist and Krueger (1991) quarterly birth 
dummy choice as a success. The judgment is made despite the obvious fact that attendance law 
indicators are a better reflection of the CSL than quarterly birth dummies. The finding that IV 
estimates diverge further away from values that are economically sensible as indicators become 
a better approximation of the true CSL is surprising. Although Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014) 
use a further improved set of attendance law instruments and control variables to rescue the 
formerly failed research design, the rescue is unsuccessful as evident from Figure 1. 
This paper probes into the causes of the ‘failed research design’ through a careful re-
examination of two data sets, one from Angrist and Krueger (1991) (AK hereafter) and the 
other from Stephens Jr. and Yang (2014) (SY hereafter).3 The two datasets are useful for cross-
                                                          
3 The data used by SY is an extended version of the data and indicators used by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). 
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5 
validation as they are both created from the 1980 US census but with different indicators and 
choice of control variables. The paper commences by addressing two questions: 1) Are the 
instruments used in SY statistically valid for cases where the resulting IV estimates are 
significantly different from their OLS counterpart? 2) Can those valid IV estimates, presented 
in AK and SY, outperform their OLS counterpart in terms of consistency and robustness? 
Based on extensive experiments presented in Section 2, the answer to both questions is 
negative. This puts into doubt the usefulness of the CSL-randomisation route. 
Section 3 traces the failed research design to confused causal model specification. In 
particular, it explains that the IV approach amounts to the premise of the education variable 
being an invalid conditional variable; a premise which has been overwhelmingly rejected in 
Section 2. Careful consideration of the causal links between the variables of interest reveals 
the logical necessity of decomposing the outcome effects into two parts: returns to schooling 
and the average treatment effect (ATE) of the CSL via schooling. The decomposition enables 
the translation of the possible moderation effect of CSL on schooling to a parametric shift in a 
multivariate model setting.  
Section 4 applies this approach of decomposition to the two data sets. For the outcome 
effects, we find a virtually invariant returns to schooling estimate of 0.06, and smaller ATE of 
the CSL estimates between 1-5% if using school law indicators and 0.2- 0.9% if using quarter 
of birth indicators. However, considering imperfections of CSL indicators identified in Section 
2, estimates of the CSL effect are far less robust than those of the returns to schooling 
parameter. Moreover, we find little evidence for a CSL-induced parametric shift in the returns 
to schooling parameter using the available CSL indicators.  
The methodological implications of our findings are discussed in Section 5. We 
pinpoint the failure of the research design to the choice of the IV approach instead of 
inappropriate indicators. The IV approach is a detour into deadlock, as it effectively denies 
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direct translation of causal postulates of interest into statistically conditional relationships. We 
argue that a successful research design has to be focused on model design, i.e. on how to 
faithfully translate the causal postulates into testable conditional hypotheses in data-consistent 
models.      
2. Where Does the Research Design Fail? 
Let us start from the basic model design of AK and SY. Briefly, denote education by s 
and outcome by y, the returns to education can be expressed by: 
(1)  ݕ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚݏ ൅ ߟ. 
AK and SY assume ܿ݋ݒሺݏߟሻ ് 0, based on the argument that η contains omitted variables 
which are not directly observable but collinear with s, such as innate ability. The OLS is thus 
an inconsistent estimator for (1) and the inconsistency can be treated by IV estimators using 
the CSL as a key instrument. The resulting IV estimator amounts to appending (1) by: 
(2)   ݏ ൌ ߨܮ ൅ ܫ௝ᇱࢽ௝ ൅ ߝ 
where ܮ represents the CSL and ܫ௝ other IVs.4 Equation (2) can be seen as the first stage of the 
two-stage OLS (2SLS) estimator to produce an IV estimate ߚ௅, with ߚ௅ ് ߚ.  
Since the CSL is latent in the cross-section samples used by AK and SY, it has to be 
approximated by observable indicators, ࣦ. Quarterly birth dummies are chosen by AK 
(hereafter denoted as ࣦ஺௄). The indicator choice is based on the insight that the CSL requires 
a minimum age which has to be reached before students can drop out of school. Those born in 
the first quarters of the year reach this age sooner than those born in later quarters and hence 
are less constrained by the law than their peers. Accordingly, AK define three birth dummies 
for those born in the first (ࣦ஺௄ଵ ), second (ࣦ஺௄ଶ ) and third (ࣦ஺௄ଷ ) quarter of the year.  
SY, with reference to Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), propose two alternative indicators 
based on state school and labour law. These capture required years of schooling (ࣦௌ௒ଵ) and 
                                                          
4 See equation (2) of SY and equation (1) of AK. 
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7 
compulsory attendance (ࣦௌ௒ଶ).5 As in AK the indicators compose of three dummies. ࣦௌ௒ଵଵ ,  
ࣦௌ௒ଵଶ , and ࣦௌ௒ଵଷ  capture those with minimum of 7 or below, 8, and 9 or above required years of 
schooling and ࣦௌ௒ଶଵ , ࣦௌ௒ଶଶ , and ࣦௌ௒ଶଷ  capture those with 8 or below, 9, and 10 or above years of 
compulsory school attendance. 
The choice of CSL indicators alters estimation results considerably and SY, in contrast 
to AK, succeed in finding ߚ௅ ് ߚ. However, a close scrutiny through replication of SY’s 
Tables 1 and A2 suggests that their CSL indicators are largely invalid instruments. Column (1) 
in T1B of our Table 1 is the only exception, with no rejection of Sargan’s null of valid 
overidentifying restrictions and rejection of Hausman’s null of OLS estimator consistency 
relative to IV. Although the validity of instruments is confirmed for column (2) in T1A of Table 
1, the IV estimates remain insignificant.  
TABLE 1—SARGAN AND HAUSMAN TEST FOR INSTRUMENTS USED BY SY 
  T1A (ࣦௌ௒ଵ)  T1B (ࣦௌ௒ଶ) 
White males  aged 40-49  aged 25-54  aged 40-49  aged 25-54  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
ߚ (OLS)1 0.073** 0.073**  0.063** 0.063**  0.073** 0.073**  0.063** 0.063**  
ߚ௅ (2SLS)1 0.095** -0.020  0.097** -0.014  0.142** 0.092**  0.140** 0.086**  
Tests:             
Sargan2 
(p-value) 
0.99 
(0.6088) 
4.65  
(0.0977)  
17.99  
(0.0001) 
7.51  
(0.0234)  
0.64  
(0.7271) 
0.83 
(0.6589)  
12.75  
(0.0017) 
17.57  
(0.0002)  
Hausman 
(p-value) 
3.80  
(0.0512) 
9.67  
(0.0019)  
43.24  
(0.0000) 
36.32  
(0.0000)  
16.33  
(0.0001) 
0.53  
(0.4671)  
150.29  
(0.0000) 
3.28  
(0.0701)  
Fixed effects:             
State of birth Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Year of birth Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Region x Yob No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  
Additional controls None None  Age 
quartic, 
census yr 
Age 
quartic, 
census yr 
 None None  Age 
quartic, 
census yr 
Age 
quartic, 
census yr 
 
Notes: ** denotes significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level; 1 robust and cluster adjusted standard errors are used; 2 Wooldridge’s extension of Sargan’s 
test of overidentifying restrictions is performed. Source: SY Tables 1 and A2 – Sargan and Hausman added through replication. 
 
A closer look at Table 1 reveals that larger differences between IV and OLS estimates 
occur predominantly when regional interaction terms with year of birth indicators are included 
(columns (2) and (4) of T1A and T1B). At the same time, the inclusion of interaction terms 
invalidates the claim of endogeneity if using ࣦௌ௒  indicators and leads to insignificant IV 
                                                          
5 See SY for a detailed definition of the indicators. 
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estimates if using ࣦௌ௒  indicators. The sensitivity of IV estimates to regional factors is 
acknowledged by SY and reiterated by Hogerheide and van Dijk (2006, Table 5).6 This raises 
the question whether SY’s IVs solely represent the CSL treatment. Since regional variation 
effects cannot be disentangled from those IVs, the interpretation of insignificant coefficient 
estimates as zero CSL effect is disputable.    
The insignificance and empirical inconsistency of IV estimates, already identified in 
Figure 1, could be caused by a negligible share of ‘compliers’ in the full sample; a point made 
by Oreopoulos (2006a) in the context of the CSL effect when using minimum years of 
schooling indicators. Since most people remain in school beyond the required years, the great 
majority of the sample belongs to a sub-population for which the ATE of the CSL is expected 
to be zero. In other words, the CSL is potentially binding only for school leavers, but by and 
large not for those who have continued education beyond the compulsory years of schooling. 
Using ࣦௌ௒ଶ indicators, only 4.11 per cent of the 1930-39 born cohort complies to the law. The 
share of compliers is even smaller for the later born cohort with 2.31 per cent. Using ࣦௌ௒  
indicators instead, the share of complies is similarly small with 4.18 and 2.53 per cent in the 
1930s and 1940s birth cohort respectively (see Table 1A, Appendix). 
Aiming for consistent results, we replicate AK Tables V and VI and SY Tables 1 and 
A2, but use sub-samples by levels of educational attainment in order to separate ‘always takers’ 
from ‘compliers’. Those who receive 12 or less years of schooling are allocated to the School 
sub-sample and those with more years of education are allocated to the Higher sub-sample, 
see. Further, the tails of the two sub-samples, Higher and School, are cut to investigate whether 
dissimilarities between the sub-samples arise due to outliers (cf. Figure 1A, Appendix).  
                                                          
6 CSL indicators based on quarter of birth dummies face similar problems and Bound and Jaeger (2000) and 
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) show an entanglement of indicators with social status. 
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The experiment confirms our conjecture of zero ATE by the CSL treatment for the 
Higher sub-sample, revealing a striking inconstancy of ߚ௅ between the School and Higher sub-
sample (Table 2). The IV estimates are significant and similar to the OLS estimates for most 
of the School sub-sample while insignificant for the Higher sub-sample.7 The only IV estimates 
that are significantly different from their OLS counterparts with valid instruments across the 
two cohorts are based on ࣦௌ௒ଵ indicators for the School sub-sample. The OLS estimates, while 
significant and positive throughout all sub-samples and cohorts, vary across sub-samples, with 
returns to education decreasing for those attaining 13 to 15 years of education.8  
TABLE 2—ESTIMATION OF ߚ VIA SUB-SAMPLING ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  
  1930-39 Born 1940-49 Born 
Years of School Higher School Higher 
schooling ≤ 12 7-12 13-15 ≥ 13 ≤ 12 7-12 13-15 ≥ 13 
SY 
    ߚ   .0613** .0587**  .0546** .0935**     .0612**    .0596**    .0273**    .0641**    
[95% CI]1 [.0602  .0625] [.0573   .0601] [.0476  .0615] [.0912  .0957] [.0599  .0624] [.0581  .0611] [.0223  .0322] [.0625  .0657] 
 
ߚ௅ (with ࣦௌ௒ଵ) .0942**    .0860*    -.2577    -.0218 .1008**    .2072**    .4449    .2292     
[95% CI]1 [.0623   .1261] [.0094   .1626] [-.809   .2937] [-.585    .541] [.0710   .1305] [.0558   .3586] [-.101    .991] [-.124    .583] 
Sargan .66  (0.7198) .17 (0.9173)   2.43 (0.2963)   5.44 (0.0660)  2.07 (0.3549)   3.59 (0.1661)   8.58 (0.0137)   22.7 (0.0000)   
Hausman 4.07 (0.0437) .49 (0.4859)   1.43 (0.2325)   .17 (0.6805) 7.02 (0.0081)   4.63 (0.0315)   2.93 (0.0867)   .98  (0.3230) 
ߚ௅ (with ࣦௌ௒ଶ) .1596** .1411* -.5833    .0831 .0836**    .0671    .3829    .0168    
[95% CI]1 [.1182   .2010] [.0193   .2630] [-1.76    .591] [-.341   .5073] [.0499   .1172] [-.030    .164] [-.203    .969] [-.267   .3004] 
Sargan .21 (0.8990)   11.7 (0.0028)   3.06 (0.2171) .56 (0.7563)   7.27 (0.0264)   4.23 (0.1209)   2.33 (0.3123)  9.23 (0.0099)   
Hausman 24.6 (0.0000)  1.86 (0.1732)   1.79 (0.1807)   .002 (0.9621)  1.72 (0.1896)  .02 (0.8799)   1.75 (0.1862)   .11 (0.7419)   
AK 
ߚ .0565**  .0583** .0442** .0591** .0701**    .0734**    .0153**    .0405**     
[95% CI] [.0551   .0578] [.0564   .0601] [.0371   .0515] [.0575   .0607] [.0686   .0716] [.0715   .0753] [.0105   .0201] [.0393   .0416] 
 
ߚ௅ .0864**    .1107**    .0295     -.0446    .0067    -.0040    .0606    .2612**    
[95% CI] [.0357   .1372] [.0288   .1926] [-.309    .368] [-.147    .058] [-.051   .0641] [-.078   .0696] [-.268   .3888] [.1580   .3644] 
Sargan 24.4 (0.7088) 24.2 (0.7217)   33.4 (0.2633) 30.1 (0.4097)   60.8 (0.0005)   59.6 (0.0007)    38.0 (0.1230)   33.5 (0.2587)   
Hausman 1.35 (0.2447) 1.60 (0.2054)  .01 (0.9320)   4.44 (0.0352)   4.84 (0.0279) 4.37 (0.0367)   .07 (0.7863)   27.5 (0.0000)   
Notes: SY data follows model specification (1) Tables 1 and A2; AK data follows Tables V and VI columns (5) and (6) model specifications; “.” indicates negative 
R-square in the 2SLS regression; ** denotes significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level; 95% CI is 95 per cent confidence interval; (.) are p-values; 1 standard 
errors cluster adjusted. The discrepancy between OLS estimates obtained with SY and AK data sets is due to differences in the construction of the education variable; 
see Table 4 and discussion. 
 
The results of the above experiments show us a severe lack of consistency in the IV 
estimates. Since this finding is contrary to what is asserted, we conduct a further experiment in 
order to find out whether consistency can be restored for the School sub-sample for which CSL 
                                                          
7 The only exception is the later born cohort with AK’s model specification where all return to education 
estimators are insignificant or diagnostics reveal problems with the model design. 
8 This effect is more pronounced for the later born cohort, potentially due to educational inflation. These data 
patterns are undetectable by the CSL-based IV method, since instruments narrowly target school goers but not 
those attaining higher education and large standard errors hide significant difference across cohorts. 
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indicators ࣦௌ௒  are valid. Following SY’s Table 1 experiment, we stepwise enlarge the sample 
size by widening our focus group for the School sub-sample only: white males ages 40–49, 
white males ages 30–49, white males ages 25–54, males ages 25–54, males and females ages 
25–54 (Table 3).9 While IV estimates are relatively more invariant as sample sizes increase, 
there is no visible sign of convergence. In stark contrast, the OLS estimates show clear signs 
of convergence with increased sample size and remain remarkably invariant with regards to 
additional explanatory variables added in columns (4–5). A slight decrease in standard errors 
with an increase in sample size is discernible for IV estimates, but there is no sign of them 
converging to a single value. Further, Sargan and Hausman tests clearly reject the validity of 
the IVs for the more comprehensive samples in columns (3–5). 
TABLE 3—ESTIMATION OF ߚ WITH INCREASING SAMPLE SIZE USING SY SCHOOL SUB-SAMPLE DATA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 White Male 40-49 White Male 30-49 White Male 25-54 Male 25-54 All 25-54 
 
ߚ .0613**    .0613** .0606**    .0608**    .0618**    
[95% CI] [.0602    .0625] [.0604    .0622] [.0599    .0613] [.0601    .0614] [.0613    .0624] 
 
ߚ௅ (with ࣦௌ௒ଵ) .0970**    .0903**    .0683**    .0699**    .1126**    
[95% CI] [.0647    .1293] [.0712    .1095] [.0537    .0828] [.0582     .0816] [.1027     .1226] 
Sargan 1.20  (0.5501) 0.48  (0.7856) 5.19  (0.0747) 4.03  (0.1337) 74.6  (0.0000) 
Hausman 4.77  (0.0290) 8.98  (0.0027) 1.07  (0.3004) 2.37  (0.1241) 103.  (0.0000) 
 
ߚ௅ (with ࣦௌ௒ଶ) .1592** .1064** .1038** .1010** .1633** 
[95% CI] [.1177    .2007] [.0838    .1289] [.0866    .1210] [.0892    .1127] [.1529    .1737] 
Sargan 0.10 (0.9497) 2.08 (0.3532) 18.2 (0.0001) 15.3 (0.0005) 77.6 (0.0000) 
Hausman 24.3 (0.0000) 15.8 (0.0001) 25.0 (0.0000) 45.9 (0.0000) 409. (0.0000) 
 
Sample Size 399,428 829,304 1,283,824 1,471,196 2,618,852 
Notes: Based on SY model specifications Table 1 column (3) with race and gender added as the sample becomes more inclusive in columns 4-5; ** denotes 
significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level; 95% CI is 95 per cent confidence interval, cluster adjusted standard errors; (.) are p-values.  
 
Experimenting with the research design in SY and AK, we find, contrary to what is 
expected, that the OLS estimates outperform the IV estimates in terms of robustness, 
consistency and invariance, regardless the choice of CSL indicators. Further, the conclusion of 
no CSL effect on earnings via schooling by SY cannot be maintained because of the 
entanglement of the CSL effect with regional effects and the negligible share of law compliers 
in the samples.  
                                                          
9 AK datasets do not provide for the experiment since other age groups and genders are excluded. 
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3. Model Specification of Schooling Effects under CSL treatment: An anatomy 
The above empirical finding indicates the presence of serious misfit between the research 
design and the data sets. Let us now delve into the research design as expressed by equations 
(1) and (2). If we combine the two equations and take into consideration the shift in the 
interpretation of ߚ from the OVB-free returns to schooling to the CSL effect via schooling, we 
see that the IV approach actually implies a rejection of (1) in favour of: 
(3)  ݕ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௅ݏ௅ ൅ ߟ௅ 
where ݏ௅ denotes the fitted s from (2) and superscript L denotes the latent variable representing 
the CSL. The expected ߚ௅ ് ߚ entails ݏ௅ ≉ ݏ, which leads to the shifted interpretation. Hence, 
the essence of the IV approach is to assert ݏ௅, instead of s, as the valid conditional variable, see 
Qin (2015, 2016). This assertion is de facto rejected since the empirical evidence of the 
previous section goes overwhelmingly against the IV estimates in favour of their OLS 
counterpart. 
In order to understand what has caused the rejection, let us scrutinise the model of 
schooling effects under the CSL treatment. Since the CSL effects on income via schooling is a 
sequential event, an intuitive way to represent the event is a directed acyclic graph (DAG); see 
the left panel in Figure 2.  
  
 
 
FIGURE 2. DAGS OF RETURNS TO SCHOOLING UNDER THE CSL TREATMENT 
Notes: y denotes earnings, s, schooling, L, the CSL and ࣦ its observable indicator. A node 
inside a square indicates a latent variable; a solid node denotes a dummy/binary variable. 
The DAG in the left panel of Figure 2 shows us that, when the effect of L forms the focal 
causal interest, s takes the role of an intermediate variable, or a mediator, but when s is the 
causal variable of interest, L takes the role of a moderator exclusive for s. Whatever the causal 
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variable of interest, ݂ሺݕ, ݏ, ܮሻ, the joint density of the three variables can be recursively 
factorised and reduced as below: 
(4)     ݂ሺݕ, ݏ, ܮሻ ൌ ݂ሺݕ|ݏ, ܮሻ݂ሺݏ|ܮሻ݂ሺܮሻ ൌ ݂ሺݕ|ݏ, ܮሻ݂ሺݏ|ܮሻ, 
since ݂ሺܮሻ ൌ 1 when retrospective cross-section data samples are used. It should be noted that 
the CSL treatment implies a rule of intervention,10 namely ݕ ٣ ܮ|ݏ, so that we can further 
factorise the conditional density in (4) as:  
(5)     ݂ሺݕ, ݏ|ܮሻ ൌ ݂ሺݕ|ݏሻ݂ሺݏ|ܮሻ. 
The sequential nature of the ATE of L on y via s is expressed by the conditional 
expectation of (5), ܧሺݕ, ݏ|ܮሻ ൌ ܧሺݕ|ݏሻܧሺݏ|ܮሻ. In a linear model setting, the ATE, denoted by 
ߚ௬௅, can be derived from a chain of two simple regressions corresponding to ܧሺݕ|ݏሻ and ܧሺݏ|ܮሻ 
respectively:11 
(6)   
ݕ ൌ ߙ௬ ൅ ߚ௬௦ݏ ൅ ߝ௬
ݏ ൌ ߙ௦ ൅ ߚ௦௅ܮ ൅ ߝ௦
   ⟹  ߚ௬௅ ൌ ߚ௬௦ߚ௦௅. 
Model (6) tells us that ߚ௬௅ ് ߚ௬௦ holds in general unless ߚ௦௅ ൌ 1 can be verified, which 
is highly unlikely in view of the available findings, e.g. see Goldin and Katz (2011). Hence, 
we should expect that ߚ௬௅ ≪ ߚ௬௦. 
If ߚ௬௅ forms the only parameter of substantive interest, the chain route appears a long 
way round to estimate it, because the parameter can be estimated directly from:  
(7)    ݕ ൌ ܽ௬ ൅ ߚ௬௅ܮ ൅ ߳௬. 
However, in the event that indicators, ࣦ, are used to approximate the latent L, i.e.: 
(7’)   ݕ ൌ ܽ௬ ൅ ܾ௬ࣦࣦ ൅ ݁௬,  
                                                          
10 Refers to Rule 2 on the external intervention in (Pearl 2009, Section 3.4). 
11 See Cox and Wermuth (2004) for a general discussion on the parametric chain representation. We adopt their 
method of subscript-based parametric notation in order to highlight the consequence of different causal chain 
specifications on the parameters of regressors. 
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this direct route may result in ܾ௬ࣦ ് ߚ௬௦ߚ௦ࣦ. The defectiveness of CSL indicators due to 
entanglement with regional factors and other controls leading to indirect effects has already 
been identified in the previous section. In other words, ࣦ may fail the rule of intervention such 
that ߚ௬ࣦ.௦ ് 0 from the following regression:  
(8)     ݕ ൌ ߙ௬ ൅ ߚ௬௦.ࣦݏ ൅ ߚ௬ࣦ.௦ࣦ ൅ ߝ௬. 
This situation is illustrated in the modified DAG in the right panel of Figure 2. Two 
consequences follow. First, the chain route of (6) is more reliable than (7’) for estimating the 
ATE of the CSL via schooling; second, a test of ߚ௬ࣦ.௦ ൌ 0 using (8) can be exploited as an 
additional criterion for CSL indicator selection purpose.  
The advantage of the chain route becomes even more evident when the presence of 
control variables, denoted by Z, is taken into consideration. Although Z is chosen primarily 
from consideration of ܿ݋ݒሺݏܼሻ ് 0, some of the control variables are likely to correlate with 
CSL indicators, such as age and regional dummies in the two data sets by AK and SY. The 
DAGs with Z included are shown in Figure 3. The correlation between Z and CLS indicators 
complicates the estimation of the CSL effect. Extend (6) by Z: 
(9)   
ݕ ൌ ߙ௬ ൅ ߚ௬௦.௓ݏ ൅ ܼᇱࢼ௬௓.௦ ൅ ߝ௬
ݏ ൌ ߙ௦ ൅ ߚ௦௅ܮ ൅ ߝ௦                       
ܼ ൌ ࢻ௓ ൅ ܮࢼ௓௅ ൅ ࢿ௓                      
 
The corresponding chain representation of parameters becomes: 
(10)  ߚ௬௅ ൌ ߚ௬௦.௓ߚ௦௅ ൅ ࢼ௬௓.௦ᇱ ࢼ௓௅ ൌ ߚ௬௅ೞ ൅ ߚ௬௅ೋ. 
Now, only the first component, ߚ௬௅ೞ, in (10) corresponds to the ATE of the CSL via schooling. 
The simple regression model of (7’) is no longer fit for the purpose. 
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FIGURE 3. DAGS AUGMENTED WITH Z 
Notes: A node inside a square indicates a latent variable; a solid node denotes a 
dummy/binary variable. 
Model (9) differs from model (3) in two essential aspects: (i) s is taken as a valid 
conditional variable in the first equation of (9), and (ii) the lower equations are part of the chain 
representation rather than an instrumental step. The two income effects can thus be estimated 
separately. Moreover, the OVB-based argument underlying the IV-treatment actually applies 
to the CSL effect, rather than to the schooling effect, ߚ௬௦.௓, in (9) because of the inclusion of 
Z. In other words, ߚ௬௅ or ߚ௬௅ೞ defines OVB or part of it if viewed from ߚ௬௅ of (7). The 
measurement-errors based argument is far more relevant to CSL indicators than to s in the 
present context.12 In fact, it is virtually impossible to find conclusive proof of ܿ݋ݒ൫ݏߝ௬൯ ് 0 in 
(9) because the choice of this multivariate regression implies that no further information is 
available to downsize the error term or divide it into individual regressors. Consequently, only 
the argument of selection bias remains pertinent to the estimation of the schooling effect. 
Specifically, the CSL treatment could alter the population composition of educated workers, as 
compared to that of the pre-treatment population, e.g. through a diluted concentration level of 
‘aptitude’ (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Chapter 4), so much so that the post-treatment 
schooling effect becomes significantly different from the pre-treatment one.  
                                                          
12 The inapplicability of the measurement-errors based arguments in the present context can also be seen from 
the fact that almost no signs of expected OLS attenuations caused by measurement-error concerns can be found 
in AK or SY, namely that the OLS estimates should be statistically insignificant and smaller in magnitude than 
the IV estimates, e.g. Durbin (1954). 
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The IV remedy of this selection-bias induced effect is to maintain ߚ௅ ് ߚ from the 
perspective of retrospective data. As pointed out earlier, the IV approach amounts to rejecting 
the causal validity of s and substituting it with ݏ௅. Figure 4 illustrates the situation in two DAGs. 
Apart from the difficulty of lacking empirical means to identify a unique ݏ௅ (the right panel), 
the IV substitution confines L to an instrumental role in producing ݏ௅ and thus blocks the route 
to a chain model specification, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. DAGS OF MODEL (1) (LEFT) VERSUS MODEL (3) (RIGHT) 
Notes: Dotted lines indicate non-uniqueness; dissimilarity of ݏ௅ from s is shown 
by a semicircle; the ‘identity’ sign differentiates the first stage of the 2SLS, (2), 
from a chain model specification with respect to L. 
Consequently, the IV approach is unsuitable for tackling the question whether the CSL 
treatment has indeed resulted in a compositional shift to such an extent that it has caused a 
parametric shift in the returns to schooling, since ߚ of (1) is already rejected a priori as an 
inconsistent parameter. Under the chain model specification, the only feasible way to tackle 
this question is to carefully divide the available samples into two parts — an L-treated part 
versus a CSL unaffected part — so as to investigate whether there exists a parametric 
difference: ߚ௬௦ಽ.௓ ് ߚ௬௦ಽ෦.௓, where ݏ௅ denotes schooling of the L-treated part, and ݏ௅෥  the 
treatment unaffected part. It should be noted that even if the inequality is supported by data, 
the evidence alone is insufficient for rejecting s as a valid conditional variable for y, e.g. see 
Engle et al. (1983). Conversely, evidence against such a parametric shift does not imply ߚ௬௅ೞ ൌ
0 unless ߚ௦௅ ൌ 0 can be verified. 
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4. CSL Treatment in A Multiple Model Framework 
Following the chain model approach outlined previously, this section starts from 
estimating the two outcome effects on earnings: (a) the schooling effect or returns to schooling, 
ߚ௬௦.௓, and (b) the CSL effect or ATE of the CSL via schooling, ߚ௬௅ೞ. It then turns to 
investigating the possible presence of a L-treatment induced parametric shift in the schooling 
effect, ߚ௬௦ಽ.௓ ് ߚ௬௦ಽ෦.௓.  
4.1. Sub Estimating the Schooling Effect: ࢼ࢙࢟.ࢆ 
The presentation of varying returns to schooling estimates,  ߚ௬௦.௓, by AK and SY, 
despite the use of almost identical samples, indicates model specification problems (Table 2). 
Therefore, we proceed with the question of how to specify Z in order to find an empirically 
adequate specification of (9), which is as parsimonious as possible and also can align the returns 
to schooling estimates by AK and SY data respectively. This is achieved through firstly, 
unification of the education variable and secondly, a parsimonious model specification.  
Towards a unification of the education variable, the AK education variable is capped at 
17 years to resemble the SY education variable. The unification is found to play a vital role in 
aligning the returns to schooling estimates across the two date sets. As for the experiments 
reported in Table 2, we rely on AK’s division between those born in the 1930s and 1940s 
respectively using observations from the 1980 census. Towards a more parsimonious model, 
year of birth dummies included by both AK and SY are replaced with quadratic age (age2).13 
Regional dummies for individual states are replaced by a single variable distinguishing 
between four regions for SY and nine regions for AK data (region). Considering a possible 
regional effect on school quality, variables capturing school quality (pupilt, term, reltwage) 
                                                          
13 Coefficients on year of birth dummies are found to decline with years revealing non-linearity. These patterns 
can be almost perfectly replicated with a quadratic age variable. See also Murphy and Welch (1992) for the non-
linear relationship between experience and wage earnings. 
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suggested by Card and Krueger (1992a, 1992b) are used by SY and included in our model as 
well. 
A notable pattern of parameter inconstancy in Table 2 is the variation in the returns to 
schooling estimates with the level of education. A variable is thus added to capture these 
variations, known as ‘sheepskin effects’. Sheepskin effects as well as education inflation are 
well documented phenomena in the literature14 and clearly discernible in the AK and SY data; 
see Figure 1A and Table 1A, Appendix. This shift in the population education composition 
also explains the finding by Goldin and Katz (2000). In order to control for these data patterns 
across cohorts, a dummy (uni) turning one for those who obtained a university degree (15 or 
more years of schooling) is added.  
The key results of this model search are reported in Table 4, alongside with those from 
the 'Original’ models by SY and AK. We refer to our more parsimonious specifications as 
‘Alternative’ in the table. An alignment of return to schooling estimates across datasets is 
achieved with the ‘Alternative’ model specification, which outperforms the ‘Original’ 
specification in terms of model fit. In particular, the OLS estimates point to a constant ߚ௬௦.௓ of 
roughly 0.06 across data sets and cohorts. Our returns to schooling estimates are in line with 
findings by Pischke and Wachter (2008) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), who report 
estimates of 0.061 and 0.075 respectively. This finding indicates that the risk of OVB for ߚ௬௦.௓ 
comes mainly from inadequately specified Z in the 'Original’ models.  
  
                                                          
14 See, for instance Angrist (1995), Murphy and Welch (1992), Trostel (2005) and Clark and Martorell (2014).  
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TABLE 4—PARSIMONIOUS SPECIFICATION OF (9) 
 Original  Alternative 
 SY  AK  SY  AK 
 1930-1939 1940-1949  1930-1939 1940-1949  1930-1939 1940-1949  1930-1939 1940-1949 
ߚ௬௦,௓  0.0751** 0.0622**  0.0630** 0.0519**  0.0600** .0643**      .0576**    .0648**    
[95% CI] [.074  .077] [.0612   .063]  [.062   .064] [.051   .053]  [.058  .062] [.063  .066]  [.057  .059] [.064  .066] 
AIC 714262.9 1034376  594994.7 858645.2  705271.2      1018112  594343.4     858594.8     
Adj.-R2 0.0119 -0.0232  0.1745 0.1354  0.1217 0.0968  0.1761 0.1355 
Z age2 age3 age4 yob31-yob39/ 
yob41-yob49 sob1-sob55 
 ageq, ageq2, race, married, 
smsa, neweng midatl, 
enocent, wnocent, soatl, 
esocent, wsocent, mt, yr20-
yr28 
 age2, mar, emp, jail, 
handcap, pupilt, term, 
reltwage, uni, region 
 age2, mar, race, smsa, uni, 
region 
Notes: 1980 census, data for SY white male with positive weekly earnings, data for AK male with positive weekly earnings; ** denotes significance at the 1% 
level and * at the 5% level; AIC is Akaike information criteria; 95% CI is the 95 per cent confidence interval; 95% CI based on cluster adjusted standard errors in 
SY data; pupilt is the pupil-teacher ratio, term is the length of the school term, and reltwage is the average teacher salaries (see Card and Krueger (1992b) for more 
information on the creation of the variables); mar, emp, jail, and handcap are dummy variables capturing marital status, employment status, prior convictions and 
disabilities. 
 
4.2. Estimating the ATE of the CSL via Schooling: ࢼ࢟ࡸ࢙  
Given the imperfections of CSL indicators identified in Section 2, we conduct two 
simple experiments to further test the appropriateness of the indicator choice before continuing 
with the estimation of ߚ௬௅ೞ. Since CSL is only binding for school leavers, we would expect the 
ATE to be insignificant or at least smaller for those with higher education than for those 
without. Following this reasoning, we estimate the middle equation of (9) using subsample 
groups by educational attainment as in Table 2, with the expectation that ߚመ௦௅ ് 0 for School 
and ߚመ௦௅ ൌ 0 for Higher.  
It is shown in Table 5 that, although ߚመ௦௅ tends to be larger for the School subsample 
than for the Higher sub-sample, none of the indicators confirms the hypothesis of ߚመ௦௅ ൌ 0 for 
Higher. Noticeably, the size of those ߚመ௦௅ ് 0 in the first cohort has almost doubled that of the 
second cohort in the case of SY indicators. This shift appears to reflect a general shift towards 
more years of education. As seen from Table 1A (Appendix), the share of those attaining less 
or equal the minimum years of schooling is halved in the later cohort.  
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TABLE 5—ߚ௦௅  IN (9) VIA SUB-SAMPLING ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
 SY  AK 
 ࣦௌ௒ଵ  ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦ஺௄ 
1930-
1939 
School Higher  School Higher  School Higher 
Coef. t-stat1 Coef. t-stat1  Coef. t-stat1 Coef. t-stat1  Coef. t-stat2 Coef. t-stat2 
ߚ௦ࣦభ 0.38* 2.50 0.06 0.69  0.18 1.84 -0.10**
 -4.33  -0.12** -8.74 0.02 1.17 
ߚ௦ࣦమ 0.35* 2.49 0.07 0.91  -0.02 -0.23 -0.05*
 -1.98  -0.11** -8.43 0.05** 3.10 
ߚ௦ࣦయ 0.18 1.25 0.06 0.75  0.39** 3.99 -0.12**
 -4.27  -0.03* -2.39 -0.00 -0.04 
 ࣦௌ௒ଵ  ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦ஺௄ 
1940-
1949 
School Higher  School Higher  School Higher 
Coef. t-stat1 Coef. t-stat1  Coef. t-stat1 Coef. t-stat1  Coef. t-stat2 Coef. t-stat2 
ߚ௦ࣦభ 0.70** 11.34 0.13** 3.47  0.24** 4.59 -0.05 -1.57  -0.10** -9.89 0.04** 3.71 
ߚ௦ࣦమ 0.69** 10.61 0.25** 7.63  -0.03 -0.57 0.03 1.00  -0.08** -7.82 0.06** 5.09 
ߚ௦ࣦయ 0.42** 6.25 0.19** 5.75  0.21** 3.40 -0.06* -2.11  -0.02* -2.45 0.03* 2.25 
Notes: 1980 census, data for SY white male with positive weekly earnings, data for AK male with positive weekly earnings; 1 robust cluster adjusted standard 
errors; 2 robust standard errors; ** denotes significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. 
 
In a second step, we test whether the rule of intervention  ߚ௬ࣦ.௓௦ ൌ 0 holds for the 
different CSL indicators by estimation of (8) with additional controls Z. In reference to earlier 
experiments, we conduct the test for the School sub-sample in addition to the full sample 
estimation. It is shown in Table 6 that the condition ߚ௬ࣦ.௓௦ ൌ 0 is validated for SY’s ࣦௌ௒ଵ 
indicator across cohorts and also for AK’s ࣦ஺௄ indicator for the early born cohort. But it is 
violated without exception if using ࣦௌ௒ଶ as CSL indicator. Where conditional independence is 
rejected in Table 6, we have also failed to confirm ߚመ௦௅ ൌ 0 for the Higher sub-sample (see 
Table 5) and rejected instruments as invalid (see Table 2). In cases like this, we should be 
cautious with the estimate of ߚ௬௅ೞ via the chain representation of (10).  
TABLE 6—TEST FOR THE RULE OF INTERVENTION ߚ௬ࣦ.௓௦ ൌ 0 USING (8) EXTENDED BY ܼ 
 SY  AK 
 1930-39  1940-49  1930-39  1940-49 
 Full School  Full School  Full School  Full School 
 खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛ खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛  खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛ खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛  ख࡭ࡷ  ख࡭ࡷ 
ࣦ1 -.001 .041** .007 .041**  .014 .041** .007 .046**  -.007* -.008  -.012** -.005 
ࣦ2 .011 .028** .029 .030**  .016 .047** .020 .052**  -.004 -.009*  .012** .010** 
ࣦ3 .021 .060** .033 .063**  .033** .078** .031* .082**  .001 -.003  .012** .017** 
Notes: 1980 census, data for SY white male with positive weekly earnings, data for AK male with positive weekly earnings; ** denotes significance at the 1% 
level and * at the 5% level.; robust cluster adjusted (for SY) standard errors are used; Z as specified in ‘Alternative’ in Table 4. 
 
Table 7 provides ߚ௬௅ೞ estimated via (10). Where conditional independence was verified, 
the chain approximation yields significant ATE estimates that confirm our expectation of a 
larger effect of schooling on earnings than that of the CSL, i.e. ߚ௬௦.௓ ≫ ߚ௬௅ೞ. Direct ATE 
estimates ߚ௬ࣦ  obtained via (7’) exceed estimates obtained via chain approximation for the later 
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born cohort (see Table 2A, Appendix). The effect is indicative of positive indirect CSL effects 
through control variables Z in later years. Further, chain approximations using SY indicators 
are much more varied across cohorts than across sub-samples, due mainly to the varying 
estimates of ߚ௦௅ in Table 5. The estimated ATE almost doubles for the later born cohort from 
1–3 to 3–5 per cent using ࣦ ୗଢ଼ଵ indicators. The ATE estimates using AK indicators are relatively 
constant across both sub-samples and cohorts. It should be noted that the negative sign here 
actually implies a positive ATE because people born in the first three quarters ࣦ஺௄ଵ , ࣦ஺௄ଶ  and 
ࣦ஺௄ଷ  are associated with less years of schooling as compared to those born in the fourth quarter. 
The CSL effect is strongest for those born in the first quarter and weakens with the second and 
third quarter born consecutively.  
TABLE 7—ESTIMATED ATE OF CSL, ࢼ࢟ख࢙, USING CHAIN MODEL (9) 
 SY  AK 
 1930-39  1940-49  1930-39  1940-49 
 Full School  Full School  Full School  Full School 
 खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛ खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛  खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛ खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛  ख࡭ࡷ  ख࡭ࡷ 
 
ࣦ1 .025** .011 .022* .011*  .054** .016* .048** .016**  -.009** -.007**  -.007** -.007** 
ࣦ2 .005 -.003 .021* -.001  .033** -.004 .045** -.002  -.006** -.006**  -.004** -.005** 
ࣦ3 .004 .012 .011 .023**  .027** .002 .028** .014**  -.002* -.002*  -.003** -.002** 
Notes: See Tables 4 and 5 for ߚ௬௦.௓ and ߚ௦௅ estimates respectively. 1980 census, data for SY white male with positive weekly earnings, data for AK male with 
positive weekly earnings; SY adjusted for clustering of observation and robust standard errors are used; ** denotes significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% 
level. The p-values for ߚ௬ࣦೞ are based on Χ
2 statistics estimated following Weesie (1999).  
 
Our ATE estimates are in rough agreement with findings reported in the literature. For 
instance, Pischke and Wachter (2008) report the ATE of CSL in Germany to be between 0.012 
and 0.017 for different datasets. Results presented by Oreopoulos (2006b) for Canada suggest 
a larger ATE between 0.031 and 0.107, which is similar to our estimates using ࣦௌ௒ଵ. Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2001) report the ATE of CSL to be between 0.008 and 0.009. A moderate positive 
impact of CSL on schooling was further confirmed by Lleras‐Muney (2002), Oreopoulos 
(2006a), Goldin and Katz (2011). 
4.3. Testing for a CSL Induced Shift in the Schooling Effect: ࢼ࢙࢟ࡸ.ࢆ ് ࢼ࢙࢟෤ࡸ.ࢆ 
If the introduction of the CSL has altered the ability composition of workers, the post 
treatment schooling effect, ߚ௬௦ಽ.௓, might differ from the schooling effect before treatment, 
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ߚ௬௦̃ಽ.௓, namely ߚ௬௦ಽ.௓ ് ߚ௬௦̃ಽ.௓. To investigate if such a parameter shift has occurred, break-
point Chow tests are conducted. The test requires careful sub-sample division conditional on 
the L-treatment and also different choices of CSL indicators.  
For the AK law indicators, the treated group is defined as those born in the first and 
second quarters of the year, while the untreated group is defined as those born in the remaining 
quarters. Since the CSL is binding for only a minority of the treated group — as evident from 
the negligible share of compliers (Table 1A, Appendix)15— the ability composition is unlikely 
to render a significant parameter shift using the full sample. Sub-sample division minimises 
defectors and always takers in the treated group of the School sub-sample. A parametric shift 
should hence be discernible for the School but not the Higher sub-sample. As can be seen from 
Table 8,16 despite the carful sub-sample division, the null hypothesis of no break point cannot 
be rejected at the 5 per cent level in all experimental settings. 
TABLE 8—TEST FOR ࣦ஺௄ INDUCED PARAMETRIC SHIFT 
 1930-1939  1940-1949 
 Full School (7-12) Higher (13-15)  Full  School (7-12) Higher (13-15) 
Chow Test (Treated-
Full)1 
0.65 
(0.4184) 
0.72 
(0.3949) 
0.19 
(0.6652) 
 
0.76 
(0.3842) 
0.25 
(0.6137) 
0.18 
(0.6673) 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full)2 
0.56 
(0.4549) 
0.63 
(0.4286) 
0.19 
(0.6617)  
1.05 
(0.3053) 
0.17 
(0.6769) 
0.18 
(0.6673) 
Notes: 1980 census, male with positive weekly earnings, p-values in (.). 1 The treated sub-sample is defined as those born in the first and second quarters. 2 
Untreated sub-sample is defined as those born in the third and fourth quarters.  
 
For the SY indicators the sub-sample division is slightly more complicated. ࣦௌ௒ 
indicators capture the minimum years of schooling and school attendance required by the 
respective state’s labour and education law, but only few states had no law in place over the 
sample periods, which results in a rather small sub-sample for the untreated. Further, the nature 
of the CSL indicators enables us to minimise defectors and always takers even further in the 
treated group of the School sub-sample. The treated group is re-defined as those among the 
School sub-sample who received treatment under a particular law and leave school right after 
                                                          
15 Although Table 1A (Appendix) is based on SY data, the patterns are likely to be identical for the AK data.  
16 See Table 3A (Appendix) for full results. 
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the minimum years of schooling required by the law are completed. The sub-sample is 
denominated School Binding. Although the treated group does not fully capture those 
compliant to the law, the group fully encompasses those compliant while minimising the 
number of those defecting in the group under the given information.  
As can be seen from Table 9,17 using ࣦௌ௒ଵ indicators, the break-point Chow tests 
provide no evidence for a treatment induced parametric shift in the returns to education 
parameter at the 1 per cent significance level and some evidence at 5 per cent significance level 
for the School Binding sub-sample. Using ࣦௌ௒ଶ as indicator, there is some evidence for a 
parametric effect for the later born cohort. The effect is absent from the Higher sub-sample as 
expected, but detectable at the 5 per cent level for the Full sample and School sub-sample. 
However, given measurement errors identified for the ࣦ ௌ௒ଶ indicators, the evidence is too weak 
to conclude on a parametric shift.   
TABLE 9—TEST FOR ࣦௌ௒ INDUCED PARAMETRIC SHIFT IN ߚ௬௦ಽ.௓ 
 1930-1939 
 Full  School (7-12y)  Higher (13-15y)  School Binding3 
 ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ 
Chow Test 
(Treated-Full)1 
0.01 
(0.9172) 
1.80 
(0.1797) 
 
0.01 
(0.9236) 
0.06 
(0.8056) 
 
0.46 
(0.4990) 
0.09 
(0.7693) 
 
1.26 
(0.2607) 
2.59 
(0.1076) 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full)2 
0.02 
(0.8848) 
0.37 
(0.5417) 
 
0.03 
(0.8574) 
0.10 
(0.7556) 
 
0.38 
(0.5395) 
0.20 
(0.6569) 
 
4.45* 
(0.0350) 
0.19 
(0.6596) 
 1940-1949 
 Full  School (7-12y)  Higher (13-15y)  School Binding3 
 ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ  ࣦௌ௒ଵ ࣦௌ௒ଶ 
Chow Test 
(Treated-Full)1 
2.24 
(0.1342) 
2.28 
(0.1312) 
 
1.49 
(0.2220) 
1.96 
(0.1617) 
 
0.02 
(0.8847) 
0.00 
(0.9896) 
 
0.00 
(0.9580) 
14.05** 
(0.0002) 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full)2 
5.04 
(0.0248) 
4.23* 
(0.0396) 
 
3.25 
(0.0713) 
6.06* 
(0.0138) 
 
0.05 
(0.8195) 
0.02 
(0.8966) 
 
0.26 
(0.6115) 
2.41 
(0.1206) 
Notes: 1980 census, white male with positive weekly earnings; p-values in (.). 1 The treated sub-sample is defined as those born in a state with some school law 
in place, that is, minimum years of schooling unequal zero. 2 Untreated sub-sample is defined as those born in a state with no school law in place, that is, 
minimum years of schooling equal to zero. 3 Definition of treated and untreated change for this experiment. The treated sub-sample is defined as those who 
drop out after the minimum years of schooling and the untreated sub-sample comprises of the remaining observations. 
 
Overall, the evidence for the presence of an L-treatment induced parametric shift is 
weak and rattled with deficiencies in the CSL indicators. If the substantive interest is with a 
data-consistent estimate of the returns to schooling parameter, data patterns originating from 
                                                          
17 See Table 4A (Appendix) for full results. 
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sheepskin effects and educational inflation are found to be of far greater concern than an L-
treatment induced parametric shifts (see Tables 2 and 4).  
5. What have we learnt? 
Angrist and Pischke (2015), in their analysis of the failed research design in Acemoglu 
and Amgrist (2001), ascribe the failure to inappropriate CSL indicators, while maintaining the 
IV approach as appropriate. In contrast, this paper elucidates that the failure is not with the 
choice of instruments, but the choice and conceptualisation of the IV approach. A re-
assessment of the approach in Section 3 leads us to identify several cognitive flaws. The IV 
treatment is originally motivated by the desire for consistent estimation in the (potential) 
presence of OVB, measurement error and/or self-selection bias linked to innate ability when 
using observational data. However, a careful reconsideration of the causal claims via DAGs, 
shows that the relevance of these concerns crucially depends on the parameter of interest 
associated with the key conditional variable.  
If the parameter of interest is the ATE of the CSL via schooling, concerns regarding 
selection bias and measurement error in the schooling variable are irrelevant, since ݏ merely 
acts as a mediator for L. As evident from Tables 5–7, measurement error in CSL indicators is 
actually a major concern. CSL indicators fail to consistently target school goers, fail the rule 
of intervention and result in non-robust ATE estimates. These weaknesses in the CSL 
indicators call for a more careful indicator selection if the key parameter of interest is the law 
treatment effect. 
If the parameter of interest is returns to schooling, L acts as an exclusive moderator for 
s. The parameter would not be affected by L unless the moderating effect induces a parametric 
shift. We find little evidence of such a shift using the CSL indicators of AK and SY (Tables 8 
and 9), despite the shift being implicitly asserted in the IV estimation and apparently verified 
by SY (Table 2 and Figure 1). However, the evidence by SY is shaky as we have shown how 
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empirically inconsistent their IV estimates are (Section 2). The apparent parametric shift in SY 
can be explained by the fact that the CSL dummy based IV estimation effectively implies 
reweighting the samples towards those with primary and secondary school education, leading 
to a substantial loss of sample information (best seen from Figure 4). The reweighting is 
justified by the need for post-treatment quasi-randomisation due to selection bias. However, it 
would be a serious misunderstanding to associate both concepts – randomisation and selection 
bias – directly with the data samples here since census data, used by both AK and SY, are 
randomly collected by design.  
It is shown in Section 3 that the essence of the IV approach is to reject s as a valid 
conditional variable. This rejection is refuted by cross validation in Section 2 and by the 
empirical evidence presented in Section 4. The implicit alteration of model (1) to model (3) by 
the rejection results in a conflation of the underlying causal relationships, leading to 
interpretational difficulties of the IV estimates. This conceptually ambiguous interpretation of 
the IV estimates highlights the importance of a clear translation of causal relations into a well-
designed statistical model, which allows for an assessment of the circumstances under which 
the conditional variable of interest is valid.  
 Using DAGs, we reinstate clearly defined causal relationships by explicit model 
design. We show that, if the causal effect of the key conditional variable is compounded by 
another variable – be it a moderator or a mediator – a multivariate model specification is 
essential in order to verify the conditional variable of interest. Further, a clear differentiation 
between moderator and mediator effects is imperative. In a multivariate model setting concerns 
arising over measurement error, selection bias and OVB need to be carefully assessed with 
regards to individual parameters. For instance, in the case analysed in this paper, our model 
design reveals that the greater risk of OVB with respect to the returns to schooling estimate 
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comes from inadequate specification of Z rather than the possible omission of L, opposite to 
what underlies the IV-based research design.  
Our results demonstrate that the IV method is a detour into deadlock for the estimation 
of both the returns to schooling and the ATE of the CSL. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly 
supports the rehabilitation of s as the valid conditional variable in a multivariate model setting. 
Our causally explicit model design allows for a careful analysis of the model setting within 
which relatively data-coherent inference can be made about the conditional status of s. The 
investigation tells us that a successful research design has to be focused on appropriate model 
design, i.e. a faithful translation of causal postulates into data-consistent statistical models, 
rather than on the choice of estimators. 
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Appendix 
 
a. 1930-1939 SY b. 1930-1939 AK 
c. 1940-1949 SY d. 1940-1949 AK 
 
FIGURE 1A. YEARS FOR SCHOOLING DENSITY 
Notes: AK education variable is capped at 17 years of schooling for comparability between the AK 
and SY datasets. 
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TABLE 1A—COMPOSITION OF CSL COMPLIERS, DEFECTORS AND ALWAYS TAKERS FOR ࣦୗଢ଼  
Composition of CSL Compliers for SY खࡿࢅ૚ 
 खࡿࢅ૚૚ ൌ ૚ खࡿࢅ૚૛ ൌ ૚ खࡿࢅ૚૜ ൌ ૚ Total  Years of Schooling Untreated 
1930-1939 
Equal 1.37% 5.48% 4.10% 4.11%  ࣦௌ௒ଵଵ : <7 3.75% 
Less 2.09% 4.00% 10.19% 6.97%  ࣦௌ௒ଵଶ : <8 5.88% 
More 96.45% 90.57% 85.71% 88.50%  ࣦௌ௒ଵଷ : <9 12.28% 
N 54,992 116,112 193,730 366,381  N (% of total) 1,547 (0.42%) 
1940-1949 
Equal 0.45% 2.23% 2.90% 2.31%  ࣦௌ௒ଵଵ : <7 3.20% 
Less 0.69% 1.55% 5.40% 3.75%  ࣦௌ௒ଵଶ : <8 5.28% 
More 98.86% 96.22% 91.70% 91.71%  ࣦௌ௒ଵଷ : <9 8.87% 
N 86,252 112,481 337,979 548,870  N (% of total) 12,158 (2.22%) 
Composition of CSL Compliers for SY खࡿࢅ૛ 
 खࡿࢅ૛૚ ൌ ૚ खࡿࢅ૛૛ ൌ ૚ खࡿࢅ૛
૜ ൌ ૚ Total  Years of Schooling Untreated 
1930-1939 
Equal 5.23% 4.11% 5.03% 4.18%  ࣦௌ௒ଶଵ : <8 5.09% 
Less 3.65% 10.67% 10.52% 7.44%  ࣦௌ௒ଶଶ : <9 10.79% 
More 91.20% 85.22% 84.45% 88.38%  ࣦௌ௒ଶଷ : <10 14.73% 
N 116,797 179,705 36,489 366,381  N (% of total) 33,390 (9.11%) 
1940-1949 
Equal 1.79% 3.00% 3.16% 2.53%  ࣦௌ௒ଶଵ : <8 2.53% 
Less 1.38% 5.64% 6.09% 4.30%  ࣦௌ௒ଶଶ : <9 5.41% 
More 96.83% 91.36% 90.74% 93.17%  ࣦௌ௒ଶଷ : <10 8.37% 
N 131,875 297,498 82,481 548,870  N (% of total) 37,016 (6.74%) 
Notes: ‘N’ is sample size, ‘equal’ is share of those with years of education equal to school law, and ‘less’ years of education and ‘more’ years of education 
respectively for those treated by the respective law. For the untreated group, share of those with less than 7, 8, and 9 years of education among untreated is 
given. ‘Total’ compares ‘Untreated’ against total of the sample in the equal to the law, less than the law and more than the law of schooling categories.   
 
 
TABLE 2A—ESTIMATED ATE OF THE CSL β୷ࣦ  via (7’)  
 SY  AK 
 1930-39  1940-49  1930-39  1940-49 
 Full School  Full School  Full School  Full School 
 खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛ खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛  खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛ खࡿࢅ૚ खࡿࢅ૛  ख࡭ࡷ  ख࡭ࡷ 
ࢼ࢟ख  
ࣦ1 .033 .037** .014 .053**  .127** .077** .121** .095**  -.014** -.012**  .008** .005 
ࣦ2 -.010 .022 -.0004 .024  .114** .050* .119** .060**  -.009** -.016**  .009** .006 
ࣦ3 .014 .071** .006 .106**  .110** .095** .105** .125**  .0005 -.005  .010** .016** 
Notes: 1980 census, data for SY white male with positive weekly earnings, data for AK male with positive weekly earnings; ** denotes significance at the 1% 
level and * at the 5% level; robust cluster adjusted (for SY) standard errors are used; estimation of (7’). 
 
 
TABLE 3A—TEST FOR ࣦ஺௄ INDUCED PARAMETRIC SHIFT 
 1930-1939  1940-1949 
 Full School(7-12) Higher(13-15)  Full  School(7-12) Higher(13-15) 
Full (t-stat) .0576** (104.)    .0571** (63.2) .0405** (7.19)  .0648** (116.) .0723** (76.2) .0265** (6.73) 
N 329,311 188,486 53,883  486,707 228,087 106,941 
Treated1 (t-stat) .0571** (73.3)   .0579** (45.4) .0381** (4.87)  .0641** (81.9) .0727** (54.1) .0250** (4.60) 
N 161,711 95,303 28,075  254,384 118,162 56,884 
Untreated2 (t-stat) .0581** (74.0) .0563** (44.0) .0430** (5.32)  .0655** (82.7) .0717** (53.6) .0283** (4.94) 
N 167,600 93,183 25,808  232,323 109,925 50,057 
Chow Test (Treated-
Full) 
0.65 
[0.4184] 
0.72 
[0.3949] 
0.19 
[0.6652] 
 
0.76 
[0.3842] 
0.25 
[0.6137] 
0.18 
[0.6673] 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full) 
0.56 
[0.4549] 
0.63 
[0.4286] 
0.19 
[0.6617] 
 
1.05 
[0.3053] 
0.17 
[0.6769] 
0.18 
[0.6673] 
Notes: 1980 census, male with positive weekly earnings, p-values in (.). 1 The treated sub-sample is defined as those born in the first and second quarters. 2 
Untreated sub-sample is defined as those born in the third and fourth quarters.  
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TABLE 4A—TEST FOR ࣦௌ௒ INDUCED PARAMETRIC SHIFT  
 TEST FOR ࣦௌ௒ଵ INDICATOR 
 1930-1939 
 Full School (7-12) Higher (13-15) School Binding3 
Full (t-stat) .0607** (109.) .0616** (68.2) .0463** (12.9) .0606** (67.2) 
N 366,381 208,599 59,540 208,599 
Treated1 (t-stat) .0607** (109.) .0616** (68.1) .0461** (12.9) .0690** (8.89) 
N 364,834 207,750 59,256 15,261 
Untreated2 (t-stat) .0619** (8.87) .0641** (5.10) .0730    (1.63) .0617** (61.0)  
N 1,547 849 284 193,338 
Chow Test (Treated-
Full) 
0.01 
[0.9172] 
0.01 
[0.9236] 
0.46 
[0.4990] 
1.26 
[0.2607] 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full) 
0.02 
[0.8848] 
0.03 
[0.8574] 
0.38 
[0.5395] 
4.45 
[0.0350] 
 1940-1949 
 Full School (7-12) Higher (13-15) School Binding3 
Full (t-stat) .0643** (120.) .0739** (80.5) .0199** (8.40) .0740** (80.7) 
N 548,870 256,848 118,714 256,848 
Treated1 (t-stat) .0644** (118.) .0741** (79.4) .0198** (8.28) .0744** (9.26)    
N 536,712 250,973 115,894 13,220 
Untreated2 (t-stat) .0575** (19.9) .0645** (12.6) .0235    (1.51) .0742** (73.2) 
N 12,158 5,875 2,820 242,663 
Chow Test (Treated-
Full) 
2.24 
[0.1342] 
1.49 
[0.2220] 
0.02 
[0.8847] 
0.00 
[0.9580] 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full) 
5.04 
[0.0248] 
3.25 
[0.0713] 
0.05 
[0.8195] 
0.26 
[0.6115] 
 TEST FOR ࣦௌ௒ଶ INDICATOR 
 1930-1939 
 Full School (7-12) Higher (13-15) School Binding3 
Full (t-stat) .0607** (108.) .0616** (68.2) .0463** (12.9) .0606** (64.2) 
N 366,381 208,599 59,540 208,599 
Treated1 (t-stat) .0604** (102.) .0615** (64.5) .0460** (12.2) .0653** (21.0) 
N 332,991 189,437 54,563 22,605 
Untreated2 (t-stat) .0619** (35.4)    .0607** (22.0) .0514** (4.38) .0609** (60.2) 
N 33,390 19,162 4,977 185,994 
Chow Test (Treated-
Full) 
1.80 
[0.1797] 
0.06 
[0.8056] 
0.09 
[0.7693] 
2.59 
[0.1076] 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full) 
0.37 
[0.5417] 
0.10 
[0.7556] 
0.20 
[0.6569] 
0.19 
[0.6596] 
 1940-1949 
 Full School (7-12) Higher (13-15) School Binding3 
Full (t-stat) .0650** (121.) .0753** (82.0) .0203** (8.56) .0739** (80.5) 
N 548,870 256,848 118,714 256,848 
Treated1 (t-stat) .0653** (117.) .0757** (79.2) .0203** (8.26) .0857** (27.5) 
N 511,854 239,545 110,763 25,964 
Untreated2 (t-stat) .0603** (30.9) .0670** (20.3) .0215* (2.36) .0731** (71.0) 
N 37,016 17,303 7,951 227,348 
Chow Test (Treated-
Full) 
2.28 
[0.1312] 
1.96 
[0.1617] 
0.00 
[0.9896] 
14.05** 
[0.0002] 
Chow Test 
(Untreated-Full) 
4.23* 
[0.0396] 
6.06* 
[0.0138] 
0.02 
[0.8966] 
2.41 
[0.1206] 
Notes: 1980 census, white male with positive weekly earnings; p-values in [.]. 1 The treated sub-sample is defined as those born in a state with some school 
law in place, that is, minimum years of schooling unequal zero. 2 Untreated sub-sample is defined as those born in a state with no school law in place, that is, 
minimum years of schooling equal to zero. 3 Definition of treated and untreated change for this experiment. The treated sub-sample is defined as those who 
drop out after the minimum years of schooling and the untreated sub-sample comprises of the remaining observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
